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INTERNAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CUSTOMARY LAW
AND GENERAL
LAW IN ZIMBABWE: FAMILY LAW AS A CASE STUDY
D o r is  P e t e r s o n  G a l e n * *•
INTRODUCTION
Under Zimbabwean law and despite the achievement in April 1980 
of majority rule, with regard to family law and personal law, 
discriminatory treatment of Africans and women persists. Despite the 
passage since Independence of two Acts designed to help eradicate racism 
and sexism in Zimbabwe (the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, 
1 “ the Primary Courts Act” and Legal Age of Majority Act, 2 “ the Legal 
Age of Majority Act” ) the statute books still contain pre-Independence 
legislation preventing equal treatment of Africans and women.
The Primary Courts Act eliminated racially based criteria for 
determining which system of law should apply to a particular dispute. It 
introduced new guidelines for resolving conflicts between customary law 
and general law, a significant move towards equality under the law. It 
repealed an Act containing a provision that exempted disputes between 
Africans from many general family law statutes.*
J
The Legal Age of Majority Act conferred majority status on all 
Zimbabweans aged 18 years or above. Previously, most African women 
had remained minors all their lives. They suffered from the restrictions 
which accompanied minority status. The Legal Age of Majority Act helped 
women achieve equality. Despite these achievements, the present law still 
discriminates against women and Africans. Co-existence of customary law 
and general law can result in discrimination.
? A dispute whether customary or general law should govern a case 
constitutes an internal conflict of laws. Conflict of laws means a dispute 
between two different systems of law. Generally each system constitutes 
the law of a particular area, often an entire country. ■ The conflict issue 
a court must resolve involves deciding which of the two systems to apply 
to a particular dispute between private parties; whether, for example, 
Zimbabwean or French law should apply to a dispute over a contract. 
That cdnstitutes an issue of international conflict of private laws. 
Zimbabwe has general law and various systems of customary law, all
* B.A. (Mich), J.D . (Yale) Lecturer in Law, University of Zimbabwe
The writer is deeply indebted to Denis A.B. Robinson of the Law Department for his many 
helpful suggestions. Many of the ideas relating to family law were developed in discussion 
with Mr Robinson between 1981 and the present. The writer is also indebted to Prof. Robert 
B. Seidman of Boston University School of Law and to Welchman Ncube, Staff Development 
Fellow, and Julie Stewart of the Law Department for their criticism and comments.
'• Act No. 6 of 1981.
2- Act No. 15 of 1982.
*• The African Law and Tribal Courts Act, Chapter 237.
4applicable throughout Zimbabwe. When a court has to decide whether 
to apply general law or customary law or whether to apply one system 
or another of customary law, it must decide an internal conflict of laws 
issue.
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This article focuses on current internal conflict of laws problems 
concerning disputes between customary law and general law. It does not 
reach internal conflict of laws disputes involving a choice between two 
or more systems of customary law.< Herein, “ internal conflicts”  refers 
to conflicts between customary law and general-law.
Because of the triadic system of pre-Independence courts in 
Zimbabwe* and because of racist laws controlling the chbice of a system 
oflaw , few internal conflict of laws problems came before the superior 
courts. Most internal conflict of laws disputes involving a choice between 
customary law and general law in Zimbabwe have developed since 
Independence. After majority rule, the Government and Parliament made 
efforts to eliminate discrimination based on race and sex and to restructure 
the courts and the legal system to make them colour-blind and capable 
of providing more even-handed justice. As a result, necessary and 
far-reaching changes have already occured and more will probably occur 
in the near future.
Part I of this article will examine how, faced with a dispute as to 
whether customary law or general should govern a case, a Zimbabwean 
court should proceed to determine which system of law should be applied. 
It will also consider the jurisdiction of various Zimbabwean courts with 
respect to the application of customary law and general law.
Part II will examine some aspects of family law as it relates to internal 
conflict of laws problems with respect to me application of customairy 
law and general law. It will examine the four types of Zimbabwean 
marriage and the internal conflict of laws problems relating to the 
consequences of each type of marriage.
Part III will deal with proposals for legislative reform to eliminate 
or lessen some problems in family law. Emphasis has been placed in the 
article on short term easily implemented solutions to family law problems 
resulting from internal conflict of laws. More far reaching and fundamental 
reforms which are urgently needed are beyond the scope of this article.
One of the problems resulting from conflicts between customary law 
and general law is that each o f these two different systems provides for 
different rights and obligations on many matters. NofPAfricans have sopie 
rights which Africans do not have. Africans have a' few rights which *•
*■ Section 4 o f the Primary Courts Act contains the guidelines for determining which of two 
^ s te rn s  o f customary law should be applied.
*• See discussion of Zimbabwean courts and conflicts of laws under the pre-Independence statute 
“ <~nnflict o f Laws-The Application o f Customary Law and the Common Law jo
-  —. an International amt Comparative Law Quarterly S f  (1981).
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non-Africans do not have. Men have some right which women do not have. 
This disparity of rights is, in the main, due to legislative enactments.
The proposals for reform aim at achieving equal rights for all 
Zimbabweans, regardless of race, sex, which court hears a case, or which 
system of law the court applies. While customary law and general law 
co-exist in Zimbabwe, differences between the rules of law on the same 
issue under customary law and general law will continue. However, as 
discussed infra, various reforms can eliminate discrimination and can 
increase options available to Africans.
PART I — RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND GENERAL LAW
A . The Current Status o f  Customary Law and General Law
, The Constitution of Zimbabwe, section 89, and the Primary Courts 
Act, sections 2 and 3, depict what constitutes the law of Zimbabwe and 
contain Zimbabwe’s choice of law rules. r gng?nil<,ntly, gtatntps law 
overrides Roman-Dutch common law and customary law. Subject to the 
existence of a relevant statute, general law amTcustomary law have equal 
status as systems of law.
Section 89 of the Constitution provides:-
/
Sr
“ Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in ' 
force in Zimbabwe relating to the application of African 
customary law, the law to be administered by the Supreme 
Court or the High Court and by any courts in Zimbabwe 
subordinate to the High Court shall be the law in force in the 
Colony of the Cape of-Good Hope on 10th June, 1891, as 
modified by subsequent legislation having in Zimbabwe the 
force of law”
Section 89 makes a statute override common J aw. It also makes the 
tpplication of general law subject to any statute bn the application of 
customary law..
Section 2 of the Primary Courts Act defines the two systems o f law 
as follows:-
“  ‘customary law’ means the customary law of the 
indigenous people of Zimbabwe or any .section or community 
thereof;”
“ ‘general law of Zimbabwe’ means the common law of 
Zimbabwe and any enactment, and excludes customary law;”
At the time the Constitution came into effect in April 1980, the
6African Law and Tribal Courts Act,6 (“ the Tribal Courts Act” ), 
regulated the application of customary law. During 1981, the Primary 
Courts Act repealed the Tribal Courts Act. The Primary Courts Act now 
controls the application of customary law.
B. Application o f  Customary Law Prior to Independence
Under the triadic court system in effect prior to the adoption of the 
Primary Courts Act, some courts dealt only with disputes between 
Africans. Tribal courts, presided over by chiefs and headmen, had 
jurisdiction only to apply customary law. District commissioner’s courts, 
presided over by white district commissioners, had jurisdiction to apply 
both customary law and general law in accordance with the choice of law 
provisions of section 2 and 3 of the Tribal Courts Act. Section 3 of that 
Act empowered district commissioners to determine any civil case between 
Africans on between an African and a person who was not an African. 
In practice, the court dealt with cases between Africans. A dispute between 
an African and a non-African was litigated either in a magistrate’s court 
or in the High Court, depending on the subject matter of the case and 
the amount in dispute. These courts applied general law. If an action 
commenced in a magistrate’s court required the application of customary 
law, a magistrate could order the case to be commenced afresh in a district 
commissioner’s court.7 *Although it had jurisdiction to apply customary 
law, if the then General Division of the High Court had such a case, it 
transferred the case to a district commissioner’s court. For example, in 
Mpambwa v MpambwcP Beadle C J, said:
“ I should like to refer here to my judgement in the case of 
Kusikwenyu v Parsons G D 26 of 1972 (not yet reported) 
where I pointed out that where there are matters which are 
essentially matters of African custom with which this court is 
not familiar, the proper courts in which to pursue these 
matters are either the district commissioner’s court or the 
tribal courts set up under the African Law and Tribal Courts 
Act 1969” .9 *S
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Prior to the enactment of the Primary Courts Act, a case having a 
potential internal conflict issue usually found its way to a district 
commissioner’s court. District commissioners had jurisdiction to apply 
customary law and general law. They most often applied customary law 
to dispute between Africans. District commissioners rendered judgements, 
sometimes without making clear what system of law was being applied. 
Cases which has been decided under Roman-Dutch law and cases decided'
6‘ See note 3, supra.
7' Section 13(2) of the Magistrates Court Act, Chapter 18. This subsection was repealed b y )
section 30 of the Primary Courts Act.
•• 1974 (2) RLR 20.
Moambwa, supra at p. 23.
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under customary law were cited in judgments as precedents in support 
of a rule of law the district commissioner or court of appeal for African 
civil cases wished to apply. The court rendering the judgment often did 
not appear to realize that precedents under general law and under 
customary law could not be used interchangeably. Internal conflict issues 
rarely reached any appeal court. If cases went to the court of appeals for 
African civil cases, the parties rarely appealed such cases to the then 
Appellate Division of the High Court, even though such appeals were 
possible, albeit expensive.
C. The Impact o f  the Primary Courts A ct on the Jurisdiction o f
Various Courts
The Primary Courts Act, in 1981, abolished the tribal courts, the 
district commissioner’s courts and the court of appeal for African civil 
cases and established the primary courts. These included village courts, 
community courts and district courts, the last named being magistrate’s 
courts specially designated to hear appeals from community courts. These 
courts have jurisdiction to apply only customary law and to hear only civil 
cases except that community courts are empowered to hear certain criminal 
cases (although none has done so to date). In 1982, community courts 
were empowered to make maintenance orders in accordance with the 
provisions of the Maintenance Act10 (“ the Maintenance Act” ). For 
primary courts, internal conflict disputes involve a jurisdictional issue. 
Unless it is determined that customary law applies, the court loses 
jurisdiction to hear the case, subject to the exceptions discussed supra.
All Zimbabwean courts now have jurisdiction to apply customary law. , 
The provision in the Magistrates Court. Act which allowed a magistrate 
to avoid deciding a case if it required the application of customary law 
has been repealed.11 The magistrate’s courts, the High Court and the 
Supreme Court all have jurisdiction to apply either customary law or 
general law in a civil case, subject only to monetary and other restrictions 
upon the jurisdiction of magistrate’s courts contained in the Magistrates 
Court Act.* 12
If a village court or a community court decides that a case should 
be determined under general law, except as explained suprq, the primary 
court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If a case otherwise within the 
jurisdiction of a  magistrate’s court is brought in that court or a .case is 
commenced in the High Court, the court may hear and determine the case 
regardless of whether it decides that customary law or general law is the 
proper system of law to apply in-the particular case.
D. Current Jurisdiction o f  Zimbabwean Courts Is Mis-Understood
,0- Chapter 35.
**• See note 7 supra.
12' See Section 13 of the Magistrates Court Act.
8Members of the legal profession and the Government continue to 
debate the issue of whether or not magistrate’s courts have jurisdiction 
to apply customary law. Debate is also continuing on whether Part I of 
the Primary Courts Act applies in all Zimbabwean courts or only in 
primary courts. Part I contains four sections (section 3 - 6). With few 
exceptions, the statutory law of Zimbabwe as to when customary law 
applies and when general law applies are contained within section 3. No 
other statute contains guidelines for choosing between customary law and 
general law. None of the sections in Part I is specifically restricted to 
primary courts. As those sections do not contain restrictive language, they 
constitute statutory law which overrides conflicting provisions of 
Roman-Dutch common law and customary law. Every Zimbabwean court 
is bound to follow those provisions.
A recent undated judgment In the matter between Nhamburo and 
Nhamburo delivered by the Magistrates Court for the Province of 
Matabeleland demonstrates that at least some magistrate’s courts do not 
realize that they have jurisdiction to apply customary law and they are 
required to follow the guidelines in section 3 of the Primary Courts Act. 
The Nhamburo case involved an application for summary judgement 
arising from a summons issued by the plaintiff to have the defendant 
ejected from property. The defendant claimed she had a customary law 
right to remain in the house in dispute. The magistrate’s court dismissed 
the application for summary judgment on the ground that as community 
courts had* been given jurisdiction to hear certain claims in connection 
with immovable property, a magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to 
hear such a claim. The magistrate probably was referring to section 12(1) 
(cl) of the Primary Courts Act which provides:-
“ 12 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any
enactment, a primary court may in any civil case—
* * *
“ (cl) make such order as may be necessary to enforce any 
right to use or occupy immovable property held in accor­
dance with customary law.”
The property in question was located in the Luveve suburb of Bulawayo. 
It had been inherited by plaintiff in accordance with customary law hut 
was not “ held in accordance with customary law.”  Plaintiff registered 
it in his own name and held a deed of transfer. It was, therefore, held 
in accordance with general law. A  community court would have no 
jurisdiction to deal with defendant’s claim of a right of occupancy based 
on customary law. Even if  jurisdiction had been conferred on community 
courts, that would not have deprived magistrate’s courts of existing 
jurisdiction which was not taken from them by any statutory provisiQn. 
Section 13 (1) (b) (iii) of the Magistrates Court Act gives a magistrate’s 
court jurisdiction “ in actions of ejectment against the occupier of any 
house, land or premises situate within the province” . There is nothing
in the Magistrates Court Act which restricts such courts to the application 
of generallaw in the way primary courts are restricted to the application 
of customary law by section 11 (1) (a) and 11 (2) (a) of the Primary Courts 
Act.
Galen, Internal Conflict o f  Laws in Zimbabwe
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In his unpublished judgment in the Nhamburo case, the magistrate 
incorrectly stated the issue thus:
“ As I see it, the central issue in this case put in its most 
simple form is this a matter which should be decided 
according to the general law of Zimbabwe as applied in the 
Magistrates Civil Court or is this a matter which should be 
heard before the Community Court and decided according to 
the Customary Law?” 13
The issue the magistrate’s court should have decided was whether it 
should determine the matter under general law or'under customary law. 
Part of the reason for the magistrate’s court’s confusion can be noticed 
from a further statement in the same judgment where the magistrate said:
“ With respect in my opinion, the provisions of section 3 of 
Act 6/81 [Primary Courts Act] apply only to cases which 
come before a Primary Court as defined in A ct 6/81 or a 
District Court as defined in Act 6/81” (emphasis court's)14
Most respectfully, as noted supra, neither section 3 of the Primary 
Courts Act, nor any other statutory provision restricts the application of 
this section to cases before primary courts.^ It applies to cases in every court 
in Zimbabwe. Section 3 contains the guidelines for determining whether 
customary law or general law should be applied in a particular case. The 
Constitution, section 89, made the application of general law subject to 
the “ provision o f . . .  law for the time being in force in Zimbabwe relating 
to the application of African customary law.”  Section 3 is the current 
provision relating to the application of customary law. Every court, 
including the Supreme Court, must apply that section in deciding whether 
customary law or general law is the proper system to apply in a particular 
case. It would be an intolerable situation if different choice of law rules 
could be applied in different Zimbabwean coufts for deciding whether 
customary law or general law should govern a case.
»
E. A n  Historical Perspective on the Extent o f  the Coverage o f  
Substantive Law Statutes
The Tribal Courts Act provided that statutes relating to certain issue 
should not affect the application of'customary law to Africans unless 
specifically made applicable to Africans. In defining customary law, section 
2 of the Tribal Courts Act provided:-
“ customary law’ in relation to a particular African tribe, 
means the legal principles and judicial practices of such tribe 
except in so far as such principles or practices are repugnant
13' Nhamburo, supra at p,2.
I4' Nhamburo, supra at p X
to — (a) natural justice or morality; or (b) the provision of 
any enactment:
Provided that nothing in any enactment relating to the age of 
majority, the status of women, the effect of marriage on the 
property of the spouse, the guardianship of children or the 
administration of deceased estates, shall affect the application 
o f  customary law, except in so fa r  as such enactment has 
been specifically applied to Africans by that or any other 
e n a c tm e n t (emphasis added).
This provision was abolished by the repeal of the Tribal Courts Act. 
A similar provision to the one quoted supra was contained in the African 
Law and Courts Act15 (“ the African Law and Courts Act” ) which was 
in effect from 1937 until it was repealed in 1969 by the Tribal Courts Act. 
With respect to many statutes relating to family law which will be discussed 
infra, the restrictive provision discussed supra was in effect at the time 
of their enactment. Consequently, most substantive family law statutes 
did not apply to Africans. The effect of the repeal of the restrictive 
provision on the extent of the coverage of the statutes affected will be 
discussed infra.
F. Choice o f  Law Provisions in Section 3 o f  the Primary Courts Act
We now turn to section 3 of the Primary Courts Act to see how it 
provides for the choice between customary law and general law to be made. 
Section 3 commences as follows:
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“ 3 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of any 
other enactment, unless the justice of the case otherwise 
requires . . . ”  (emphasis added).
The section then goes on to state that customary law shall be applicable 
to cases where certain conditions exist and that in other cases general law 
shall be applicable. The application of customary law or general law is, 
in each case, made subject to a relevant statute. In other words, section 
3 provides that statutes override both customary law and common law. 
Now all Statutes apparentiyapply to disputes between Africans unless there 
is a statutory provision with respect to a particular statute specifically 
providing that it does not apply to such disputes.
Many statutes, which do not specifically say whether or not they apply 
to Africans, may now have become applicable to Africans even though 
when enacted the statute would not have been applicable to such disputes 
because of the restrictive provision in section 2 of the Tribal Courts Act 
quoted supra or because of a similar provision in the African Law and
15, Chapter 104 of 1963 Revised Edition of the Statutes. When enacted entitled Native Law and 
Courts Act, No 33 of 1937.
11
Counts”Act.16 Although one may assume that the extent of the coverage 
of certain substantive law statutes has been extended by the Primary Courts 
Act, open questions exist as to the coverage of some statutes which can 
be settled,orily by further enactments of Parliament or by judgments of 
the Supreme Court. Attention will be drawn to some of those open 
questions in connection with the discussion infra of family law problems.
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A court dealing with a case involving an internal conflict of laws issue ■ 
must first resolve~the cnoice nf law dispute before dealing with the 
substantive Jaw issue in the case If a substantive law statuieis potentially 
relevant to the main issue in the case, this statute must be examined in 
connection with the choice of law dispute as the court must determine 
whether or not it is applicable. If the statute is applicable, the court must 
decide that general law is the proper system of law to apply. If the court 
has jurisdiction to apply general law, it can then proceed to hear the case. 
If it does not have jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action..
The application of customary law is also made subject to a “ justice 
)f the case”  otherwise requiring exception. It is respectfully submitted 
hat this provision in subsection (1) of section 3 restricts when customary 
aw can be applied and means that it should not be applied if “ the justice 
>f the rasp ntfrerwicp jpqnirps” This “justice of the case”  clause does 
lot empower acourt to apply customary law and ignore a statute relevant 
6 the issue bein'gadiudicated.
The now repealed Tribal Courts Act contained the same “ unless the 
justice of the case otherwise requires”  provision. It was interpreted by 
the then General Division of the High Court in Jirira v Jirira11 as 
allowing a court on the basis of the Europeanised life style of the litigants 
to apply general law to the proprietary consequences of their marriage 
and to ignore a  statutory provision which required the application of 
customary law to the proprietary consequences of such a marriage. Most 
respectfully, it is suggested that a court may deride to apply general law 
instead of customary law only where there is no applicable statute requiting 
th; application to customary law.
The “ justice of the case”  provision should be resorted to rarely, to . 
justify the applicatiop of general law and only if a grave-iaiustice would 
be done by applying customary law-to a case where relevant factors such 
as mode of life of the parties indicate that customary law should be applied .^
Section 3 (1) (a) of the Primary Courts Act goes on to deal with the 
application of customary law. It provides that “ customary law shall be 
applicable in any civil case where-
(i) the parties have expressly agreed that it should apply, or
(ii) having regard to the nature of the case and the"
16 Section 2.
,7‘ 1976 RLR 7 (GD, HC)
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surrounding circumstances, it appears that the parties 
have agreed it should apply, or
(iii) having regard to the nature of the case and the
surrounding circumstances, it appears just and proper 
that it should apply;”
Section 3 (1) (b) provides that “ the general law of Zimbabwe shall 
be applicable in other cases.”
Section 3 (1) (a) (i) allows parties to agree on which system of law 
should apply only in a case where there is no relevant statute.
G. A n  Individual May N ot Unilaterally Choose the System o f  Law 
By Which He/She Will Be Governed
No individual in Zimbabwe has an unqualified right to decide whether 
customary law or general law will govern all litigation by and against 
him/her. All litigation involves two or more adversaries^ who, theoretically 
at least, seek opposite results from the litigation. Litigants are entitled 
to have the case between them decided in accordance with the law. The 
court hearing the case determines at or before thg.time it hears the case 
what the applicable system of law is. If the rules of substantive law that 
would be applicable under the two contending Systems are the same, the 
conflict is known as a spurious conflict and the court can properly proceed 
to determine the case under the system of law chosen by plaintiff as the 
result should be the same whichever system is applied.
Where the substantive rules of law on the issue involved in a case 
differ under the potentially applicable systems of law and where 
consequently they may affect the outcome of the case, the determination 
of the conflict of laws issue may be crucial to the final outcome of the 
case. A litigant will always choose the system of law under which he/she 
would win. A court resolving a conflict of laws dispute must ignore the 
substantive rules of law under the competing systems of law and how they 
affect the parties chances of success and apply the choice of law rules. 
If the parties each wish the case to be determined under a different system 
of law, for example, one party wishes it to be determined under general 
law and the other party under customary law, the wishes of neither party 
are binding on the court.
The court before which the case is pending had the duty of deciding 
in accordance with the law of Zimbabwe which is the proper system of 
law to apply in the case before it. The court must apply section 3 of the 
Primary Courts Act without regard to the likely final outcome of the 
pending action.
H. Evidentiary Hearing Needed I f  Dispute On Which System 
Applies
Whore, in a case there is an issue as to which system of law is to apply, 
it will be necessary for the court to decide that issue before hearing the
Galen, Internal Conflict o f  Laws in Zimbabwe
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case. As noted, supra, if the case is before a primary court, the 
determination of which system of law should apply also determines whether 
or not the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Even if the case is not 
before a primary court, it will still be necessary for the court hearing the 
case to determine which system of law it will apply if that is put in issue 
by a litigant or if the court has any doubts about the proper system of 
law to apply in the case.
In some cases coming before the courts, it will not be clear which 
system of law applies. In those cases in which the court must determine 
which system of law to apply, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the matter. Every court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not 
it has jurisdiction to hear a case and so, even a community court may 
hold a hearing on jurisdiction where it is contended that general law, and 
not customary law, should apply to the case. That issue can be determined 
only after the court has considered the relevant factors as defined in section
3.
v A court should only hold a hearing on the choice of law issue if the 
defendant claims a different system of law should govern the case than 
the system contended for by the plaintiff or if a presiding officer, 
magistrate or judgeTeeli^doubt about which system should apply. A 
plaintiff may, with regard to any counterclaim made by the defendant, 
contend that the counterclaim should be determined under a system of 
law different from that contended for by the defendant. The procedure 
for determining which system of law should apply to the counterclaim 
is the same as that for determining which system of law should apply to 
the hearing of the plaintiff’s claim.
It is, of course, necessary to place the burden of proof in every dispute 
on one party or the other. It is suggested that, with reference to internal 
conflict claims, the burden should » » th» party alleging that theplain titf" 
(or the defendant, in the case of a counterclaim) has selected the iniproper 
system or the improper forum. With regard to an action in the primary 
courts, this would have the effect of creating a presumption in favour of 
the Cburt having jurisdiction. As it would only have jurisdiction if 
customary law was applicable, the result would be a presumption in favour 
of customary law being'applicable, and the burden of proof being placed 
on the party challenging that presumption. Obviously, if the evidence 
proves that customary law does not apply, a primary court must dismiss 
the case. However, the burden would lie on the party contending that 
general law applies to prove that it applies and that the court lacks 
jurisdiction. Usually, therefore, in a primary court the defendant would 
have the burden of proving that customary-law does not apply.
♦
Where the choice of law issue is not a jurisdictional issue, that is in 
courts which are not primary courts, the usual rules as to burden of proof 
could apply. This would mean that the burden of proving that plaintiff 
(defendant) had selected the improper system of law under which to make 
the claim would be placed on the defendant (or plaintiff wiHTrespect to 
a counterclaim) who is making the assertion. Most cases will not have an
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internal conflict of law issue. The parties will be able to agree as to which 
system of law should apply. A court need concern itself with the question 
o f which party has the burden of proof on the choice of law issue only 
where the parties disagree as to whether general law or customary law 
should be applied or where the court itself raises the issue. Where a court 
does this, the burden of proof should be on the party whose choice of 
law is being questioned by a court.
I. Court Dealing With Internal Conflict Dispute Must Consider
Surrounding Circumstances
If the defendant challenges the system contended for by the plaintiff, 
the court must decide whether general law or customary law applies before 
it can proceed to hear and decide the case or conclude that it must dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction. Section 3 (1) (a) governs that determination 
and allows the court to examine the nature of the case and the surrounding 
circumstances and then decide if “ it appears just and proper” that 
customary law should apply.
Section 3 (2) of the Primary Courts Act spells out the meaning of 
“ surrounding circumstances” , as used in section 3 (1) (a) (iii), which
“ shall, without limiting the expression, include-
(a) the mode of life of the parties;
(b) the subject matter of the case;
(c) the understanding by the parties of the provisions of 
customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe, as the 
case may be, which apply to the case;
(d) the relative closeness of the case and the parties to 
customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe, as the 
case may be.”
J. Court in Considering Surrounding Circumstances Must Balance
Factors
The court may consider all the factors supra in making its 
determination but, it is submitted, these do not exclude other factors which 
may constitute “ surrounding circumstances” . The court may consider any 
factors which it considers relevant. No single factor is decisive. The court 
must consider each factor to see which of the systems of law each factor 
indicates should control and then weigh all the factors against each other.
We shall now consider each factor in turn. As to the mode of life 
of the parties, if the dispute is between an African and a white, the mode 
of life or the African may or may not indicate that customary law should 
apply. The mode of life of the white will most probably indicate that 
general law .should apply. If die dispute is between two Africans, the mode 
of life of both of them may indicate that either customary law or general 
law should apply or the mode of life of one may indicate that customary 
law should apply while the mode of life of the other indicates that general 
law should apply. Where the mode of life of each of the parties indicates
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that a different system^ should apply, this factor is eliminated from 
consideration. Where the mode of life of each o ttbe  parties indicates the 
same system should apply, that is that either customary law or general 
law should apply, this is a factor which will weigh heavily in favour of 
the application of the system to which the mode of life of the parties points.
As to the subject-matter of the case, obviously that will sometimes 
point decisively in one direction or the other. A dispute over a negotiable 
instrument is not likel; to fall under customary law. A dispute over lobolo 
is likely to do so. The subject-matter of most delict cases, however, does 
not point decisively to one system or the other. For example, a cyclist 
collides with a cow. The subject-matter appears to be neutral and will not 
assist per se a court in deciding which system of law should be applied.
A court must also consider “ the understanding by the parties of the 
provisions of customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe . . . which 
apply to the case” . This criterion will rarely have relevance to the case 
of a delict. Before I collide with a cow on my bicycle, I do not think about 
what law will apply. However, if both parties to a contract have a clear 
understanding about how customary law would deal with a dispute over 
it and no understanding about how general law would deal with it, plainly 
this constitutes a strong indication that customa'y law should apply. In 
cases involving a white and an African in which this factor becomes 
relevant, the white will usually have little knowledge of customary law 
and the African may or may not have knowledge of general law. This 
factor may have to be eliminated in certain cases. In a case between two 
Africans, this factor may or may not be elimated deoending on the 
backgrounds^of the partifg
K. Section 3 (2) (d) Will Generally Control Choice o f  Law
In many, perhaps most cases, section 3 (2) (d) which focuses attention 
upon “ the relative closeness of the case and the parties to customary law 
or the general law of Zimbabwe . . . ” will influence which system of law 
should apply. I^aw constitutes part of culture. Zimbabwe has, of course 
many cultures. jA case will have a relative closeness to that body of law 
and to the relatecTculture to which the case and the parties have the closest 
connection. Many cases, and many individuals, will live in one culture 
or the other. Many cases (for example, black-white cases) and even some 
individuals (for example, an African graduate teaching at a secondary 
school in a rural area) will have one foot in each of two cultures. In the 
final analysis, in many of these cases the court will have to rely on the 
“relative closeness” test. What factors bear on this? A few are suggested: 1
1. The place where the cause o f  action arose. If a white cyclist 
in a communal area collides with an African’s cow, most 
probajjly customary law would control. If a white cyclist 
collides with an African pedestrian in Harare, whether 
customary law should apply seems more problematical.
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2. The nature o f  the case. If a white farmer commits adultery 
with the wife of one of his African workers who is married 
under the African Marriages Act,1* customary law would be 
likely to apply. If a white lecturer at the University commits 
adultery with the wife of an African lecturer, whether 
customary law should apply could well depend on whether 
the African lecturer was married under the African 
Marriages Act or under the Marriage Act.19 If the marriage 
was a customary law marriage, it would appear that 
customary law should apply. If it was a marriage under the 
Marriage Act, it would appear that general law should 
apply.
3. The place where the parties reside. If both parties live in 
Mount Pleasant in Harare, this constitutes a pull toward a 
finding that general law has the closest connection with the 
case. If both parties live in a communal area, this 
constitutes a strong pull towards a finding that customary 
law has the closest connection with the case. Where one 
party’s place of residence indicates customary law and the 
other party’s place on residence indicates general law, the 
factor would cancel out. If each party’s place of residence 
indicated the same system of law should be applied, this 
would be an indication that whichever system was indicated 
Should be applied.
4. The language o f  the transaction. That a contract or 
negotiation took place in Shona or Ndebele suggests a close 
connection to customary culture and therefore customary 
law. The use of English, however, seems neutral, for 
Africans practically always use English when dealing with 
whites, since most whites cannot speak any African 
language, or when dealing with another African where both 
parties do not speak the same African language.
Thus, as to surrounding circumstances, the court must consider a 
number of factors. None by itself is conclusive. Some will pull both ways. 
In considering them, the court must remember that in Zimbabwe neither 
customary law nor general law has preference over the other. They 
constitute equally acceptable systems of law. In deciding which applies, 
the court must examine in turn each of the factors identified in the statute 
and any others which qualify as “ surrounding circumstances” . Section 
3 (1) (a) (iii) provides that customary law shall be applicable in any civil 
case where “ having regard to the nature of the case and the surrounding 
circumstances, it appears just and proper that it should apply” . *•
**• Chapter 238. 
>9- Chapter 37.
L. I f  Factors Balance Out, Plaintiff’s Choice o f  Law Should Prevail
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In cases where the factors weight equally between choice of customary 
law and of general law, selection of one system or the other will 
unavoidably deal unjustly with one of the parties. To force an African 
who wishes to be governed by customary law to appear before a court 
where Roman-Dutch law applies or to apply customary law to a party 
who wishes to be governed by general law works an injustice. It is an equal 
injustice to bring a white before a court where customary law applies or 
to apply customary law to a case in which he is involved when he wishes 
the case decided under general law. In such a case, unfortunately, one 
or the other of the parties will feel aggrieved. The day has passed, however, 
when the African, and not the white, will always receive the unjust 
treatment. The legal system of Zimbabwe has become colour-blind. A court 
does not lose its jurisdiction to apply customary law simply because one 
of the parties is white or is an African who wishes to be governed by general 
law.
If statute law or Roman-Dutch law applies, a community court or 
a village court will lose jurisdiction. However, a primary court should not 
deliberately avoid jurisdiction which it rightfully has by giving undue 
weight to general law. In most places, the court will hold that a plaintiff 
has the choice of-fbnim. He may choose a court which has jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter and which can exercise jurisdiction over the 
defendant. A court should not disturb the plaintiff’s choice unless it finds 
that it does not have jurisdiction to proceed.
M. A Claim o f  Prescription Does N ot Require the Application o f  
General Law
An additional factor to be considered iti some cases may be that 
customary law does not bar claims by reason of prescription.*) General 
law does. Courts always look with disfavour on claims of prescription. 
To decide in favour of general law in such a case may bar the plaintiff 
from a remedy. In such cases, unless the absence of jurisdiction appears 
clear, a community court should hold that it has jurisdiction.
N. Summary
1. A community court has jurisdiction only to try civil cases to 
which customary law applies (except where specifically 
authorized by Parliament, e.g., maintenance orders).
2. A magistrate’s court, subject to jurisdictional limitations 
upon it, has jurisdiction to try civil cases to which general 
law or customary law applies.
**■ Prescription Act, N o.31 o f 1975. Section 2 (3) o f this Act provides:
"2 (3) In so far is  any right or obligation o f any person in relation to any other person is 
governed by customary law referred to in the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, 1981 
(No. 6 o f 1981) the provisions o f this Act shall not apply", (emphasis added).
3. The High Court has jurisdition to try civil cases to which 
customary law applies as well as civil cases to which general 
law applies, without any limitations.
4. Our law is colour-blind. Whether customary law applies 
does not depend upon the race of the parties.
5. Where the plaintiff contends that customary law or general 
law applies, the court should assume that it applies, and 
where the court has jurisdiction to apply the system 
contended for, that it has jurisdiction unless either:
(a) a party questions whether customary law or general law 
should apply, or
(b) the court itself has doubt about whether customary law 
or general law applies.
6. If a party or the court itself raises the question of whether 
general law or customary law should apply to the case or 
whether the court has jurisdiction, the court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing to discover whether customary law 
ought to apply.
7. At the hearing, the party (usually the defendant) if he is 
asserting that the court does not have jurisdiction because it 
is a primary court and that general law and not customary 
law applies or that the other party has chosen the wrong 
system of law, has the burden of proof on his assertion. 
Unless the defendant discharges this burden, the plaintiff’s 
choice of system of law must be allowed to stand.
8. Where the court itself raises the issue of which system of 
law applies, the party whose choice is being questioned by 
the court has the burden of proving he has selected the pro­
per system and if the jurisdiction of the court is an issue 
that the court has jurisdiction.
9. In determining whether or not to apply customary law, the 
key test usually becomes whether “ having regard to the 
nature of the case and the surrounding circumstances, it 
appears just and proper that it should apply.”
10. The statute identifies four factors which may bear on the 
“ nature of the case and the surrounding circumstances” . A 
court may, however, take other factors into account.
11. In some cases the “ mode of life” factor will balance out 
and have to be disregarded. 12
12. If the subject-matter of the case concerns a matter mainly 
foreign to customary society, ordinarily general law will 
apply. However, if it concerns a matter mainly foreign to
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the more developed sector, then ordinarily customary law 
will apply. If it concerns a matter which occurs in both 
societies, either law could apply and therefore this factor 
would have to be disregarded.
13. In determining “ the relative closeness of the case and the 
parties to the customary law or the general law of 
Zimbabwe” , among other factors, a court might turn its 
attention to:
(a) the place where the cause of action arose;
(b) the nature of the case;
(c) the place where the parties reside; and
(d) the language of the transaction.
g*ART II: A CONSIDERATION OF FAMILY LAW INTERNAL 
CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEMS
Part II of this'article is designed to demonstrate, using Family Law 
as a case study, the type of problem th§t can develop as a result of the 
continued co-existence of general Jaw and customary law in Zimbabwe. 
Internal conflict problems have also arisen in other fields such as 
succession, contracts and delict but are beyond the scope of this article.
A. A n  Historical Perspective on the Extent o f  the Coverage o f  
Family Law Statutes
\
There are ofver twenty pre-Independence statutes relevant to family 
law and succession still in existence which were enacted while the rule about 
non-application to Africans, discussed supra, was still in effect. Most of 
them are silent on the extent of their coverage and whether or not they 
apply to Africans and to marriages between Africans. At the time of their 
enactment, many were not intended to be applied to Africans or marriages 
between Africans. Before considering the extent of their present coverage, 
we shall briefly consider monogamous marriages of Africans from an 
historical perspective. Early in the history of this country, and probably 
because of the influence of missionaries, some Africans chose to contract 
a monogamous or what r  r all<*H 3 ChHctian marriqgf Apart from 
the requirements for marriage and divorce, all of the other consequences 
of such marriages for Africans were then governed by customary law. In 
1917 a statute was passed which provided that when two Africans married 
under the then general law_Marriaae-Act. the proprietary consequences 
of their marriage were to he gnwrnpH hy ni<itr>mary Iaw2i This statutory 
provision is still on our statute book as section 13 of the African Marriages 
Act.22
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Native Marriages Act No. 15 of 1917. Section 13 of this Act provided:
“ 13. Notwithstanding the fact that any natives have contracted marriage in 
accordance with the terms and provisions of the Marriage Order in Council, 1938, 
as from time to time amended, such form of marriage shall not affect the 
property of the spouses which shall be held, may be disposed of, and unless 
disposed of by will shall devolve according to native law and custom.”
Chapter 238.22.
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Prior to Independence and the enactment of the Primary Courts Act, 
the law provided that in disputes between Africans, customary law was 
to apply to custody, guardianship, status, devolution of property, marriage 
consideration, seduction, adultery and all marriages under the African 
Marriages Act.“  The all white district commissioners who adjudicated on 
a large proportion of disputes between Africans were allowed to apply 
both customary law and general law. Africans went to the (Litrict 
commissioner’s courts to obtain divorces no matter what the form of their 
marriage. About the only real distinction between the different forms of 
marriage then available to Africans was that there were different 
requirements for contracting a marriage, different grounds on which a 
divorce could be obtained and differences on the issue of whether or not 
the husband could lawfully take other wives while he had an existing 
marriage. The requirements as to lobolo and the necessary consent of the 
woman’s guardian and the proprietary consequences of the marriage and 
the law governing control over any children of the marriage were the same 
regardless of the form of the marriage chosen.
It should be noted that, pre-Independence, there was no procedure 
by which Africans could chose to have general law apply to the proprietary 
consequences of their marriage. The Jirira case discussed supra, which 
applied general law proprietary consequences to the marriage o f two 
Africans in order to award some property which she had earned to the 
wife at the time of the divorce, was an aberration. Otherwise, 
pre-Independence, customary law governed the most vital aspects of 
marriage between Africans, namely, property rights, inheritance rights and 
rights to children. It is not possible to find a solution to the problem of 
discriminatory treatment under pre-Independence law because the effect 
of the law as then applied was blatant discrimination against women and 
against Africans. African women rarely owned property and did not 
normally inherit from any male under customary law.
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B. What Family Law Statutes Now Apply to Marriages Between 
Africans
Persons choosing between one form of marriage and another most 
often do not know what rights they are selecting when they decide on the 
form of their marriage. Furthermore, there are some rights which are not 
available to Africans in connection with marriage. For example, Africans 
cannot choose to have the proprietary consequences of their marriage 
governed by general law. Africans are not presently permitted to select 
either of the two different types of proprietary consequences for their 
marriage which are available under general law.
Usually Africans choosing a form o f marriage, do not realize all the 
consequences of their choice as between the different forms of marriage 
available to them which is hardly surprising when the law is unclear at 
the present time as-to whether or not certain statutes will apply to them. 
Will it make a difference, for example, as to what law will govern a  dispute 
as to custody and guardianship whether two Africans marry under the
23. Section 3 o f the Tribal Courts Act
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Marriage Act or under the African Marriage Act? If the marriage is 
between two Africans, are custody and guardianship issues under either 
or both of those two forms of marriage governed by the Guardianship 
of Minors Act” ?24 *
When the Guardianship of Minors Act was enacted, it was not 
intended to govern disputes between Africans with respect to guardianship 
or custody. The provision about statutes not applying to Africans unless 
the statutes specifically said it applied to Africans, which was discussed 
supra, was contained in the African Law and Courts Act which was still 
in eff :ct in 1961 when the Guardianship of Minors Act was enacted. 
Nothir g was said in the Guardianship of Minors Act itself about whether^ 
or not it applied to disputes between Africans. It was clearly not intended 
so to apply at that time because such disputes were governed by customary 
law. When the Primary Courts Act provided that statute law was to over­
ride customary law and Roman-Dutch common law without regard to race, 
what effect did that have on the extent of the coverage of the Guardian-, 
ship of Minors Act which was still in existence and which until that time 
had not applied to custody or guardianship disputes between Africans? 
Nothing in the Primary Courts Act provided that a statute was not to apply 
to Africans unless the statute provided specifically that it was to so app­
ly. That provision had been repealed in 1981 when the Act containing it 
was repealed. Thus, from the time the Primary Courts Act came into ef­
fect, our law no longer provided that disputes between Africans about 
guardianship and custody must be decided under customary law/Does 
this mean that the extent of coverage of the Guardianship of Minors Act 
was extended by implication, and if so, how far? Does it now cover disputes 
about guardianship or custody of the children of Africans married under 
the Marriage Act? It would seem clear that it does. This was confirmed 
by McNally J in the High Court in Chitiyo v Chitiyo.2*
However, this is not as clear as it would seem. Recently, in Musakwa 
v: Musakwa26 the SupremeJDourt said, obiter, that Africans who were 
parties to a marriage under the Marriage Act could agree that customary 
law would control a dispute as to custody. Most respectfuLly, I do not 
think that under our present law parties can agree that where there is a 
relevant statute, such as the Guardianship of Minors Act dealings with the 
subject matter of a dispute, that customary law rather than tfie-statute 
should apply to a dispute between them. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
(fid not refer io the Uuardianship of Minors Act when it made its obiter 
’statement. See further discussion of the Musakwa case in the case note 
published in this issue of the Zimbabwe Law Review.
The extent of the coverage of the Guardianship of Minors Act is even 
more unclear when considering a guardianship or custody dispute involving 
' a child whose parents were married under the African Marriages Act. Does 
the Guardianship of Minors Act apply to custody disputes involving 
children of such a marriage? Probably not but the law on this is unclear.
24 Chapter 34.
2>' HC-H-20-83 (unreported judgment).
5-11-84 (unreported judgment).
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The Guardianship of Minors Act clearly does not apply to custody 
disputes involving children born of a customary law union which has not 
been registered. Such customary law unions are not regarded by general 
law as valid marriages except for limited purposes such as maintenance.27 
Such unions are regarded as a valid marriages for inter alia the purpose 
o f  guardianship and custody only under customary law.2*
C. Types o f  Marriages in Zimbabwe
As to the requirements for and consequences of marriage and whether 
general or customary law applies to each of these, we shall, for 
convenience, consider that there are four different types of marriage in 
Zimbabwe, namely marriages-
(1) under the Marriage Act29 (“ the Marriage Act” ) where at least one 
of the spouses is not an African;
(2) under the Marriage Act, where both spouses are African;
(3) under the African Marriages Act,30 (“ the African Marriages 
Act” )
(4) under customary law, where the customary law union has not 
been registered.
I shall discuss briefly the law governing some of the requirements for 
and some of the consequences of the marriage in the case of each of these 
four types of marriage.
(1) Marriages under the Marriage Act where at least one o f  the 
parties is not an African do not generally generate any conflict 
problems. The requirements of the marriage are set forth in the 
Marriage Act and the consequences of the marriage would be 
governed by general law. Where one of the parties is an African 
and there is an agreement as to lobolo, the lobolo agreement 
would be enforceable but such an agreement in this type of 
marriage is so rare as not to warrant further discussion here.
(2) Marriage under the Marriage Act where both parties are African 
is the type of marriage that has in the past and continues to 
generate many conflict problem.
(a) “Enabling certificates”
Where both parties marrying under the Marriage Act are African, 
they must present an “ enabling certificate”  to the marriage officer at the 
time of their marriage. Failure to do so renders the marriage void.31 A  
void marriage is one which never comes into existence. Since the new Legal 
Age of Majority Act, it appears that many Africans have been marrying
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27' See section 12 (4) (a) of the Primary Courts Act.
28' See section 3 (3) o f the African Marriages Act.
29■ Chapter 37.
30- Chapter 238.
31- Section 12 (2) o f the African Marriages Act.
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under the Marriage Act without an “ enabling certificate” . This is because 
of the belief on the part of some Government officials that the Legal Age 
of Majority Act has impliedly repealed the “ enabling certificate” 
requirement with respect to marriage under the Marriage Act where the 
parties intending to marry are 18 years of age or above. Such an 
interpretation is open to debate and does not provide the parties to such 
a marriage the assurance that the marriage is a valid marriage. I would 
therefore suggest that, while the statutory provision making such marriages 
void in the absence of an “ enabling certificate” remains that “ enabling 
certificates”  be issued routinely to any African woman aged 18 years or 
above who desires to marry under the Marriage Act. However, the 
provision requiring “enabling certificates” should be repealed as it 
discriminates against Africans. Additionally, legislation should be 
immediately enacted validating retrospectively any marriage which might 
Otherwise be held void on account of the absence of an “ enabling 
certificate” . This would prevent any husband to such a marriage, when 
he tires of the woman with whom he went through the marriage ceremony, 
from deserting her and refusing to maintain her on the ground that she 
was not his wife because the alleged marriage was void for lack of an 
“ enabling certificate” .
(b) Proprietary Consequences
The proprietary consequences of the marriage of two Africans under 
the Marriage Act are different from the proprietary consequences of a 
marriage under the Marriage Act if at least one of the parties is not an 
African. In the first type of marriage under the Marriage Act, discussed 
supra, the marrying parties can choose before tHe marriage whether they 
wish to be married in or out of community of property. However, such 
an option does not appear to be available tr> twq ^frirans marrying under 
the Marriage Act. The provision relevant to the marriage of two African 
states: __
* “ The solemnization of a marriage between Africans in terms 
of^tUs^Iarriage Act shall not affect the property of the 
spousesTwhich shall be held, may be disposed of and, unless 
disposed of by will, shall devolve according to African law 
and custom” .32
The question arises as to whether or not, while the above-quoted 
provision remains law, two Africans may enter into a marriage in terms 
of the Marriage Act and agree-before the marriage that the proprietary 
consequences of their marriage will be governed by general law and not 
by customary law.
,__Under the general law, where two parties, one of whom is not an
African, marry under the Marriage Act, their marriage will be out of
32. Section 13 of the African Marriages Act.
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community of property unless they execute a deed prior to their marriage 
declaring their wish that their marriage be in community of property.”
There is a Zimbabwean case which held that the general law applies 
to the proprietary consequences of immovable property of Africans 
married under the Marriage Act.34 At most this means that if a house or 
other immovable property belongs to the wife, and there is a divorce or 
the husband dies the wife will be able to retain the property. Otherwise, 
the only way the wife can obtain the property is if her husband wills it 
to her. Under customary law, a wife does not inherit anything if her 
husband dies without a will. There is some indication in a recent judgment 
of our then Appellate Division35 36that the wife might obtain something if 
she claimed to be a joint owner and could prove that she was. However, 
the Court noted in that judgment that Roman-Dutch law has not fully 
developed the notion of beneficial interests in property. The then Chief 
Justice, Mr Justice Fieldsend, pointed out the need for Parliamentary 
action to give our courts authority and guidelines to deal with the increasing 
number of complex cases involving property disputes between spouses 
which will arise in the future as a result of increasing numbers of both 
wives and husbands working and contributing to their joint property.
To sum up, in respect of a marriage between Africans under the 
Marriage Act, in the event of a divorce, the disposition of immovable 
property is governed by general law36 and in the event of the death of one 
of the spouses, the disposition of immovable property is governed by a 
will or, in the absence of a will, by customary law.37
(c) Custody and Guardianship
As there is now no statutory provision providing otherwise, it would 
seem that general law, and not customary law governs disputes as to the 
custody and guardianship of children born from marriages solemnized 
under the Marriage Act. However, as discussed supra,in a recent custody 
dispute where the African parents were married under the Marriage Act, 
Chief Justice Dumbutshena said that if the parents had agreed that 
customary law should apply to the custody dispute, it would have been 
proper to decide the custody dispute under customary law.38 In any 
dispute on the merits about custody in any court, regardless of whether 
or not the parents of the child are married and, if they are married, 
regardless of the type of marriage, the “ interests of the child”  is the 
paramount consideration in determining who should be awarded custody. 
This is provided for in section 3 (4) of the Primary Courts Act which states: 
“ (4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, 
in any case relating to the custody of children the interests of 
the children concerned shall be the paramount consideration, 
irrespective of which law or principle is applied.”
33, Married Persons Property Act. Chapter 38.
34, Dokotera v. The Master o f  the High Court & Others 1957 R & N 697.
35' Chiromo v Katsidzira 1981 ZLR 418 (Z, AD).
36 Note 33 supra.
37' Sections 6 and 7 of the African Wills Act, Chapter 240.
38 Note 25, supra. See note on Musakwa case in this issue of the Zimbabwe Law Review.
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This overrides the customary law rule that the prime consideration with 
respect to custody is whether or not the father of the child has paid lobolo. 
In the event of a court case over the issue of the custody of a child of 
a marriage, this “ interests of the child” provision can be relied upon by 
a mother whose marriage was solemnized under the Marriage Act to 
support her claim that she is the person best fitted to have custody.
'(3) A  marriage under the African Marriages A ct may be entered into only 
between two Africans.39 Even though non-Africans may be allowed by 
their religion or by the law of the country of which they are a citizen to 
enter into polygamous marriages, in Zimbabwe non-Africans are permitted 
to have only one wife at a time and may contract a valid marriange only 
under the Marriage Act.
(a) Requirements fo r  Marriages under the African Marriages Act
The present requirements for marriage under the African Marriages 
Act are somewhat confusing. The reason for this is that the requirements 
listed in the Act itself were designed to provide for what was necessary 
to register a customary law union. Now that an African woman aged 18 
years or above may marry without the consent of her former guardian 
on the basis that she is a major, the requirements for marriages under 
this Act can be said to have been altered insofar as they are inconsistent 
with the new Legal Age of Majority Act. Thus, lobolo is no longer a sine 
qua non in such marriages.40
However, the solemnization of marriages under the African Marriages 
Act has been further complicated by internal Ministry of Justice, Legal 
and Parliamentary Affairs regulations prescribing requirements for such 
marriages, which have been circulated to African marriage officers. These 
regulations have not been promulgated as statutory instruments and 
therefore they do not have the effect of law. They are, however, 
requirements with which apparently people now have to comply in order 
to marry under the African Marriages Act. Some of these requirements 
are more stringent even than the requirements for marriages under the 
Marriage Act. For example, although the African Marriages Act does not 
require the publication of a notice of intention to marry or the procurement 
of a licence before a marriage may be solemnized under the Act, the 
Ministry regulations require that such a notice of intention to marry be 
displayed in respect of both parties for a period of four weeks before the 
marriage may take place. Under the Marriage Act parties wishing to marry 
can avoid the delay which would be caused by the publication o f banns 
or a notice of intention to marry by obtaining a marriage licence, nor is 
there any requirement under the Marriage Act for the showing of any
W' Section 2 o f the African Marriages Act defines marriage to mean “ a  marriage between 
Africans*'.
^  As a woman aged 18 years or older Is a major, she no longer has a guardian. There is, 
therefore, no one who can withhold consent to her marriage. Formerly, lobolo was 
enforceable because she had a guardian who could withhold consent. Now lobolo is 
enforceable in connection with the marriage o f majors only if  an agreement is voluntarily 
entered into in connection with the marriage.
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special circumstances in order to obtain such a licence. However, under 
the Ministry regulations parties wishing to marry under the African 
Marriages Act can avoid the delay involved in the publication of a notice 
of intention to marry during the prescribed period of four weeks only if 
they can obtain a special licence after convincing the relevant Government 
official that “ special circumstances”  exist requiring the marriage to take 
place earlier. A marriage officer may issue a special licence but the 
regulations caution that such a licence should be “ very rarely issued” .
Because of inconsistencies between the Ministry regulations and the 
requirements of the African Marriages Act, there is a likelihood that certain 
marriages now being performed may in the future be held to be invalid. 
For example, on the one hand the African Marriages Act requires the 
marriage to be solemnized in the district in which the woman or her 
guardian reside.41 On the other hand, the Ministry regulations allow the 
marriage to be solemnized in a district agreed upon by the intending 
spouses. The problem about non-compliance with such statutory 
requirements is that one of the spouses may later succeed in having the 
marriage declared invalid on the ground that there was lack of compliance 
with the statutory requirements, with which neither the Ministry nor a 
marriage officer has the legal authority to waive compliance. This is most 
serious for the woman since both under general law and under customary 
law (unless the woman can prove a valid customary law union), the woman 
who was a party to an invalid marriage (a void marriage) is not entitled 
to maintenance from the man to whom she believed herself to be validly 
married.
(b) Proprietary Consequences
The proprietary consequences of marriages under the African 
Marriages Act are governed by customary law subject to a few exceptions. 
For example, the spouses may, by will, each dispose of any property which 
belongs to him/her. Also, ownership of immovable property, in the event 
of a divorce, is determined in accordance with general law, the 
determination being the same as if the marriage had been solemnized under 
the Marriage Act in which regard see the discussion supra.
(c) Status o f  Wife
Judge President Sandura o f the High Court recently rejected a claim 
that despite the Legal Age of Majority Act, the wife in a marriage 
solemnized under the Marriage Act reverts to minority status as far as 
financial matters are concerned and that she must be assisted by her 
husband if, as in that case, she sues for damages for a delict committed 
against her.42 The argument advanced was that the wife is in the same 
position as a woman married under the Marriage Act when the marriage 
is in community of property and where the husband has the marital power. 
In Zimbabwe, a wife who is married in community of property cannot,
4I’ Section 4 fit.
42‘ Nyemba v. Jena, HC-H-434-84 (unreported).
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because of the marital power, enter into contracts or sue unless assisted 
by her husband. Prior to the Legal Age of Majority Act, most African 
women were minors throughout their lives. Judge President Sandura held 
that the woman had locus standi in judicio to sue unassisted by her 
husband.43
(d) Guardianship
At present, disputes as to the guardianship of children born to couples 
married under the African Marriages Act are being determined in 
accordance with customary law. A minor cannot be the guardian of 
another person under any system of law in Zimbabwe. In the past when 
most African women remained minors throughout their lives, such women 
were unable to assert claims for the guardianship of their children. 
However, now that African women become majors as soon as they attain 
the age of 18 years, there is no reason why any African woman should 
not succeed in a claim for guardianship, the more so in the High Court. 
The High Court is the upper guardian of all minors within Zimbabwe and 
has the power to award the guardianship of a child to the mother rather 
than to the father or to some other male relative if it considers it to be 
in the best interests of the child to do so. The mother in such a case must 
seek to establish why the interests of the child dictate that she should be 
awarded guardianship.
(e) Custody
See the discussion supra concerning the statutory provision that “ in 
any case relating to the custody of children the interests of the children 
concerned shall be the paramount consideration, irrespective of which law 
or principles is applied.” But for that provision in section 3 (4) of the 
Primary Courts Act, customary law would govern disputes as to custody 
in the case of a marriage solemnized under the African Marriages Act. 
However, “ the interests of the child” provision must be applied by all 
courts in all custody disputes and, therefore, can be relied upon in any 
court to support a claim that a mother is the party best suited to have 
custody. Custody can be awarded to a mother who is still a minor herself 
if it is in the interests of the child that she have custody.
(4) Unregistered Customary Law Unions 
(a) Requirements
A valid unregistered customary law union while fully recognized as 
a marriage by customary law is only recognised, for certain purposes such 
as maintenance by the general law.44 Customary law controls the issue of
” • Nyemba v Jena, supra at p. 4.
44 See Section 12 (4) (a) of the Primary Courts Act. Section 3 (3) of the African Marriages Act 
provides that an unregistered customary law union shall be regarded as a valid marriage “ for 
the purposes of African law and custom relating to status guardianship, custody and rights of 
succession of children of such marriage” . This is subject to a  possible interpretation that even 
customary law may only regard such an unregistered customary law union as a valid marriage 
only for the purposes listed in section 3 (3) o f the African Marriages Act.
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whether or not a valid customary law union exists. The requirements for 
a  valid customary law union have generally been held to be (1) there must 
be consent to the marriage by the man, the woman, and the woman’s 
guardian; (2) there must be an agreement as to the amount of lobolo; and
(3) there must be a handing over of the woman by her guardian.45 
However, as the law now stands, these requirements are not all necessary 
for a valid marriage under either of the Marriage Acts, it being clear that 
not all marriages of Africans would be considered customary law unions.
General law is only concerned about customary law unions for the 
purpose of maintenance. No divorce is necessary or required to dissolve 
such a union and the parties can, as far as their status is concerned, simply 
start living separately with a declaration by the parties that the union is 
at an end.
Unquestionably, a large percentage of “ marriages” in Zimbabwe are 
unregistered customary law unions. Accordingly, it would be helpful if 
the law would accord such unions formal recognition. As the parties have 
often been living under such a union for many years, and have several 
children born of such a union which is recognized by everyone in their 
community as perfectly valid, should the “ spouses” decide to end the 
relationship they may wish to have a court declaration that the customary 
law union has been terminated. Incidentally, there is nothing in the law 
to prevent a village or community court from giving such a declaration 
provided that it is not called a divorce.
(b) Unpaid lobolo
In 1974 our then Appellate Division held that a promise to pay lobolo 
related to a customary law union was not enforceable in the courts if such 
union has not been registered.46 In 1983 at least three District Courts, 
although not citing the Appellate Division judgment, came to the same 
conclusion.47 The judgments of the Appellate Division and District 
Courts all concluded that, as the customary law unions were not registered, 
the marriages were not valid and, therefore, no order could be made to 
enforce the payment of unpaid lobolo. These judgments are based on 
section 3 of the African Marriages Act which makes unregistered 
customary law marriages invalid except for purposes of African law and 
custom relating to status, guardianship, custody and rights of succession 
o f children.4*
When it ruled that a lobolo agreement in the case of an unregistered 
customary law union was not enforceable, the Appellate Division 
overlooked the then governing Tribal Courts Act, enacted in 1970. The
*' Kurangwa a /b  Kurangwa v. Chanakira. 1966 AAC 29.
46 Choto » Motive. 1974 RLR 302 (R. A D).
47' In the Matter between : Masona and Zidom, District Court o f Mutoko, IS March, 1983; In 
the Matter between : Mukungurutse and Chadoka, District Court o f Wedza, 28 March, 1983; 
and In the Matter between : Mandizha and Gutu. District Court o f Marondera, 28 March 
1983. A ll unreported and all decided by the same magistrate sitting as a District Court.
4* See note 44 supra.
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African Marriages Act was enacted in 1951 and so, if there was an 
inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts, the provisions of 
the later Act, the 1970 Act, should have been followed.
The Tribal Courts Act defined “ marriage consideration’’ in section 
2 as follows:-
“ (a) Any payment or consideration in cash or kind proposed 
or given in respect of a marriage contracted or to be 
contracted-
(i) under customary law, whether or not it is, or is to 
be, solemnized under the African Marriages Act 
[Chapter 238]; or
(ii) under the Marriage Act [Chapter 37]; or
(b) any payment or consideration in cash or kind proposed 
or given in respect of an affiliation agreement which is 
recognized in the practice of customary law;”
Section 3 (1) (a) (v) of the Tribal Courts Act provided that customary law 
“shall” be deemed applicable in any case which is between Africans and 
which relates to “ marriage consideration” It is respectfully submitted 
that the Appellate Division was wrong in its conclusion in the case discussed 
supra that unpaid marriage consideration was not then enforceable. It is 
also submitted that the district court judgment cited supra were wrong. 
By the time of those judgments, the Tribal Courts Act had been repealed 
and replaced by the Primary Courts Act. The definition of “ marriage 
consideration” in section 2 of the Primary Courts Act is identical to that 
in the Tribal Courts Act, which is quoted supra. However, section 3 of 
the Primary Courts Act does not, as did section 3 of the Tribal Courts 
Act, specifically provide that cases involving'marriage consideration should 
be governed by customary law. Nonetheless, the adoption of a definition 
which includes marriage consideration in connection with a customary law 
union which is not to be registered under the African Marriages Act 
indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to allow the enforcement 
of claims relating to such agreements. Admittedly, however, the law is 
not totally clear on this issue and will not be until there is a decision from 
the Supreme Court on the issue or until clarifying legislation is passed 
by Parliament.
D. Conflicts Over Laws Re Marriage and Its Consequences
Some of the most difficult issues which the Zimbabwean courts win 
be called upon to resolve concern internal conflict issues in connection 
with disputes in family law related matters. This is so because of the several 
different types of marriage in Zimbabwe, as discussed supra. In the case 
of marriages involving Africans, general law governs certain aspects of 
each of the types of marriage identified and customary law governs other 
aspects.
The matter would be simple if the consequences of all marriages under
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the Marriage Act were governed by general law and the consequences of 
all marriages under the African Marriages Act and of all customary law 
unions were governed by customary law. However, that is not the position 
nor, in any event would it be desirable as a matter of public policy or 
from the standpoint of the rights of women who would be deprived of 
rights which Parliament has and might otherwise give them.' It is to be 
noted that a good argument can be submitted that, when two Africans 
decide to marry under the Marriage Act, they have thereby opted to have 
general and not customary law govern the consequences of their marriage, 
an approach which to me would seem to be the proper and correct one.
The likelihood is that most people who marry do not appreciate that 
they may be choosing, between general law and customary law as to some 
or all of the consequences of their marriage. They may realize that they 
are choosing between a monogamous marriage and a potentially 
polygamous one but they do not realize that they may also be opting as 
to which of the spouses should have interim custody of any children should 
the spouses later separate, whether they should be jointly responsible for 
the maintenance of any children or whether the husband should be 
primarily responsible or whether or not the wife may claim sole custody 
and sole guardianship in the event of a divorce.
If two highly educated Africans who have broken with the traditional
way of life marry under the African Marriages Act in order to please their
parents, the wife will not be able to obtain a divorce if the husband commits
adultery, nor will she be entitled to sue the other woman who committed
adultery with her husband for damages, nor would she be able to prevent
her husband from marrying further wives under the African Marriages
Act. However, the wife would be entitled after divorce, to have recourse
to her former husband for maintenance for herself which is not permissible
under the general law.49 *
On the other hand, if two rural Africans whose lives have always been 
governed by customary law are persuaded by a minister of religion to marry 
under the Marriage Act, the wife will be able to obtain a divorce if her 
husband commits adultery, she will be able to sue the other woman who 
committed adultery with her husband for damages, the husband will not 
be permitted to acquire a second wife while still married to his first wife 
and even if the wife leaves the husband and even if she is the guilty party, 
she would be entitled to sole custody of any children of the marriage unless 
an order to the contrary is made. She will be entitled to be consulted on 
all guardianship decisions. However, she would be entitled to maintenance
from her husband only if she obtains an order granting her maintenance, 
substantial or token, at the time of divorce, and she will probably not 
obtain maintenance unless she is the party in whose favour the divorce 
is granted.50
49 Under common law, a wife ceases to be a dependent o f her former husband at the time o f 
divorce unless she is awarded maintenance at that time.
See section 9 o f Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39.
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When dealing with consequences of customary law marriage, whether 
registered or unregistered, the problem of internal conflicts cannot be 
solved by a simple statutory provision that customary law shall apply to 
all the consequences of such marriage. To do that would deprive many 
women and children of maintenance rights which they have under general 
law.51 It would also override the important provision in section 3 (4) of 
the Primary Courts Act that the interests of the child shall be of paramount 
importance in any custody dispute regardless of what law is applicable. 
The law with regard to the consequences of customary law marriages 
should therefore be that customary law should govern the consequences 
of such marriages except where there is an applicable statutory provision 
or where the parties have exercised an option available to them under any 
law in force in Zimbabwe.
E. Some Hypothetical Illustrations o f  the Problem 
Hypothetical Case One
The following hypothetical case may help to illustrate dramatically 
the type of potential problem inherent in having in Zimbabwe general law 
and customary law operating as equal systems of law, with the choice of 
the law for a particular case depending on various factors, prominent 
among which is the mode of life of the litigants. Take, for example, a 
situation where a seventeen year old female, who was a virgin at the time, 
is seduced by a twenty year old male. Suppose that the female has lived 
for most of her life with her mothei and step-father, a Professor at the 
University, and that all of them follow a very Europeanized style of life.
However, the female’s father (from whom her mother is divorced) lives 
in the rural area, has several wives and many other children and follows 
•a customary style of life. Although the female’s mother has custody of 
her, her father is still her guardian. When the father learns of the seduction, 
he sues the seducer in the Harare community court for damages for 
seduction. Although the seducer may claim that he has never had much 
contact with customary law and that the case should be decided under 
general law, the community court could quite properly find, after balancing 
all the relevant factors, that the father’s action could be decided under 
customary law and not under general law. Accordingly, if the father 
succeeds in his action, the seducer will have to pay damages to the father 
of the female. Such a judgement would be binding, res judicata, between 
the seducer and the father. However, it would not bar the female from 
suing the seducer under general law in a magistrate’s court for damages 
for her seduction.52 If the seducer sought to plead that the female’s
3I' As all statutes are part o f the general law, any maintenance claims which is based on a statute 
is a general law claim.
52 If the young woman was still under 18 years o f age at the time she started her lawsuit, she 
would have to be assisted by a guardian ad litem. She can avoid this problem by waiting until 
after she becomes 18 years o f age before filing her lawsuit.
action against him should also be governed by customary law, the 
magistrate’s court could quite properly decide that general law should 
govern the action, with the result that, if the woman proved her case,53 
she would be awarded damages in her own right.
When I put this problem to my law students, they are shocked at the 
notion that the male should have to pay twice. I do not know of any such 
double award of damages which has actually been made against a seducer. 
However, because of the* fact that different plaintiffs are involved in the 
two actions, a judgment in either of the actions would not act as a bar 
to the other action.
Hypothetical Case Two54
Assume that a white commercial farmer has had sexual intercourse 
with the wife of one o f his African labourers. The white farmer has a wife 
to whom he is married under the Marriage Act. The labourer and his wife 
are married under the African Marriage Act. The labourer sues the farmer 
in a community court for damages for adultery. The white farmer claims 
that he is not governed by customary law and asks that the action against 
him be dismissed as a community court has no jurisdiction to decide the 
case under general law. However, by following the guidelines prescribed 
in section 3 of the Primary Courts Act and noting that the case involved 
adultery with the wife of a husband whose daily life like her husband’s 
was clearly governed by customary law and the marriage between that 
husband and wife being solemnized under the African Marriages Act, the 
court might resolve the internal conflict problem by determining that the 
case should be decided under customary law.
Contrawise, the wife of the white farmer could bring an action for 
damages under general law in either the magistrate’s court or the High 
Court depending on the amount of her claim against the African woman 
who committed adultery with her husband. If the African woman claims 
that customary law and not general law should be applied to the case, 
the court could find, following the guidelines in section 3 of the Primary 
Courts Act and noting that the case involved adultery with the husband 
of a wife, both of whom were clearly governed by general law in their 
daily lives and their marriage had been solemnized under the Marriage 
Act that general law and not customary law should apply.
Both courts, after applying the appropriate law could each decide that 
the defendant in the case before them was liable to pay damages. An 
interesting question would then arise as to whether the labourer husband 
of the African wife has any liability to pay damages for the delict by his 
wife!
53' Under Roinan-Dutch common law, all a woman need prove in a  seduction damages action to 
establish a prima facia case is that intercourse took place between herself and the defendant. 
Once she establishes intercourse, there is a presumption that she was a virgin at.the time of 
the intercourse and that the man was the seducer. The man to avoid paying damages must 
then either convince the court on a balance of probabilities that (1) intercourse did not take 
place, or (2) that the woman was not a virgin at the time, or (3 )that she and not he was the 
seducer (that being a very difficult thing to prove because he must show that she was the 
aggressor and not merely that she was a  willing and eager participant).
S4’ The writer is grateful to Denis A.B. Robinson of the Law Department for suggesting this case.
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PART III: PROPOSALS TO REMEDY SOME IMMEDIATE 
PROBLEMS — SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS
Part III is designed to suggest some specific reforms which would 
eliminate some of the problems that have resulted in the family law field 
from the co-existence of general law and customary law in Zimbabwe. 
These limited suggestions show how complex the problem is.
A. The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, No. 6 of 1981,
should be amended as follows:
(1) To provide that all the consequences of a marriage under the 
Marriage Act be governed by general law. (This should be 
accompanied by the repeal of section 13 of the African 
Marriages Act.) —
(2) To provide that parties intending to marry under the African 
Marriages Act may opt to have the proprietary consequences 
of their marriage governed by general law./This would mean 
that, prior to marriage, the parties could execute the required 
written document if they choose to be married in community 
of property. If this change were made and the parties to a 
proposed marriage did not wish to be married in community 
of property, the marriage would be out of community of 
property in accordance with the provisions of the Married 
Persons Property Act if the parties had opted to have general 
law govern the proprietary consequences of their marriage.
(3) To provide that statutes should be interpreted to override 
both the Roman-Dutch common law and customary law 
where either is in conflict with any statute unless there is an 
exclusion contained in the statute itself.
(4) Section 3 (3) provides:
“ (3) The capacity of any person to enter into any
transaction or to enforce or defend any rights in a 
court of law shall, subject to any enactment affecting 
any such capacity, be determined in accordance with 
the general law of Zimbabwe;
Provided that, if the existence or extent of any right 
held or alleged to be held by any person or of any 
obligation vesting or alleged to be vesting in any per­
son depends upon or is governed by customary law, 
the capacity of the person concerned in relation to 
any matter affecting that right or obligation shall be 
governed by customary law” .
' In the Katekwe v. Muchabaiwa case53, Chief Justice Dumbutshena said 
: at p 13:
55i S-87-84 (unreported). See note on Katekwe case in this issue of Zimbabwe Law Review.
1“ What has been directly affected and repealed by 
implication by Act 15 of 1982 is the proviso to S. 
3(3) of Act 6 of 1981. Now the capacity to enforce 
or defend any rights in a court of law or to enter 
into contractual obligations is determined and 
governed by the general law of Zimbabwe. African 
women now have full legal capacity” .
If the proviso to sub-section 3 of section 3 of the Primary Courts 
Act ha s been repealed by Parliament by implication, it would perhaps be 
better to repeal the proviso to that sub-section to avoid future uncertainty 
and debate as to its meaning. If the proviso in question has been repealed 
by implication, as the Supreme Court stated by way of dicta, this would 
mean that general law now governs the capacity of an African plaintiff 
to sue even if he or she is making a claim based on customary law. Under 
general law, an unregistered customary law union is not a valid marriage 
and, except for limited purposes such as maintenance neither partner in 
the union may sue as husband or wife, as the case may be.
(5) Section 12 (4) of the Primary Courts Act provides:
“ (4) For the purposes of an order for maintenance in terms 
of subsection (3) a community court shall, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
customary law, regard -
(a) the person who, according to customary law, is the 
husband of a woman as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of that woman during the 
marriage and, after the dissolution of their 
marriage, until her remarriage;
(b) the father of a child as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of that child until the child 
attains the age of majority.”
The policy reasons for adding section 12 (4) to the Primary Courts 
Act in 1982 were excellent. Under customary law, prior to the enactment 
of section 12 (4) (b), the father of an out-of wedlock child had no obligation 
to maintain the child unless he was given custody of the child.
Prior to the 1982 amendment56 which included section 12 (4) (a) of 
the Primary Courts Act, there was a similar provision in the Maintenance 
Act providing that husbands in customary law unions were responsible 
for the maintenance of the wife in the union.57 The provision was 
removed from the Maintenance Act and inserted into the Primary Courts 
Act. Before the 1982 amendment was enacted, community courts did not 
have jurisdiction to make any order under the Maintenance Act.
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56.
57.
Customary Law and Primary Courts Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1982.
Section 6 (3) which was repealed in 1982 by the Customary Law and Primary Courts Amend­
ment Act.
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Community courts could only apply customary law and under customary 
law it was the woman’s guardian, the person who had received or was 
to receive the lobolo, who was usually responsible for maintaining the 
woman in most circumstances where the husband or former husband failed 
to maintain her. The amendment quite properly gave community courts 
the power to order a husband to pay maintenance for his wife or former 
wife regardless of whether or not the marriage was registered. It also quite 
properly gave community courts the power to make a maintenance order 
against a father regardless of whether the child was born in or out of 
wedlock. These were changes which were helpful to women.
The difficulty, however, with the new provisions in section 12 (4) is yl 
that they are worded so that they can be applied only by a community 
court. They override customary law only if a community court is hearing 
the case. This means that if a case is brought in a maintenance court that 
court cannot properly make an order for maintenance on the basis of 
section 12 (4) (a) or (b) of the Primary Courts Act. The maintenance court 
would either have to dismiss the case and inform the applicant that the 
community court is the proper court in which to bring it or it could decide 
that customary law governs the application. Under customary law a court 
might well decide that the respondent is not liable to maintain the wife 
or child. The other alternative would be for the maintenance court to decide 
that general law is applicable. If it should apply general law, it would arrive 
at a decision different from that a community court would have reached 
as far as the woman’s claim for maintenance is concerned. Under general 
law, because of section 3 o f the African Marriages Act, an unre.gistered 
customary law union is not a valid marriage and the wife is not entitled 
to maintenance except that now she is if she makes her application in a 
community court. This is a ridiculous situation. The general law of 
Zimbabwe should not vary depending on the court in which a case is being 
litigated. The solution is simple.
Section 12 (4) of the Primary Courts Act, quoted supra could be amended 
to read:
“ (4) For the purposes o f an order for maintenance any court 
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in customary law, regard- 
fa) the person who, according to customary law, is the 
husband of a woman as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of that woman during the 
marriage and, after the dissolution of the marriage, 
until her remarriage;
(b) the father of a child as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of the child until the child 
attains the age of majority” .
[f that amendment were made, it would be competent for magistrate’s 
sourts, when sitting as maintenance courts, to award maintenance in 
ippropriate cases under the same law applied by the community courts.
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This could save vital time in having maintenance paid to those entitled 
to maintenance and in dire need of it.
B. The African Marriages Act, Chapter 238, should be amended as
follows:
(1) By the repeal of section 13 (which deals with the proprietary 
consequences of the marriage of two Africans under the 
Marriage Act and prevents such Africans from having the 
same options as to the proprietary consequences of a 
‘‘Marriage Act marriage” which other Zimbabweans have).
(2) By the repeal of sectioh 12 (which deals with “ enabling 
certificates” and prescribes a special requirement only for 
Africans when they marry under the Marriage Act. Section 
12 provides that if Africans marry under the Marriage Act 
without that certificate, the marriage is void). The primary 
courts inspectorate takes the position that the provision about 
“ enabling certificates” has been repealed by implication as 
far as Africans who are majors are concerned. It is at least 
debatable whether or not a marriage between two major 
Africans where there was no “ enabling certificate”  would be 
held void. Persons marrying should not have to gamble on 
whether or not their marriage is valid.
(3) If the guardian of a woman who wishes to marry withholds 
or refuses to give his consent to the marriage, section S 
empowers a community court presiding officer or community 
court inspector to authorize the solemnization of the marriage 
and after consultation with the guardian fix the marriage 
consideration. As “ marriage” is defined in section 2 as a 
“ marriage between Africans” , it would appear that section 5 
would apply to any marriage between Africans irrespective of 
which Marriage Act it is to be solemnized under. The result
is that, if an African woman while still a minor wishes to 
marry another African under the Marriage Art and her 
guardian refuses cogent, she,'would have to seek 
authorizatidtr’f e  thtT m arri|ge^rom  a community court 
•„> presiding officer or com piiM it^ourt inspector. If an African 
woman while still a hiinor wishe&lo marry a non-African and 
her guardian refuses cpnsent, she tfould have to seek 
authorization from a High Court Judge.58 Section 5 should 
therefore be amended to restrict its application to marriages 
under the African Marriages Act. It is inequitable to treat an 
African woman who is a minor differently, because she 
wishes to marry another African or than a non-African 
woman who is a minor, would be treated if she wished to 
marry under the Marriage Act.
58' Section 21 of the Marriage Act.
37
(4) At the present time, the African Marriages Act does not 
prescribe any minimum age under which Africans may not 
marry. There is a minimum age prescribed in the Marriage 
Act which would apply to Africans if their marriage is 
solemnized under the Marriage Act.59 Persons under the 
requisite age cannot enter into a valid marriage under the 
Marriage Act without the consent of the Minister of Justice, 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (or in certain cases of a 
High Court Judge). The reasons for requiring such consent 
for a marriage under the Marriage Act would appear to be 
equally valid as to a marriage under the African Marriages 
Act. It is recommended that a  provision containing a 
minimum legal age for marriage, similar to that in section 23 
of the Marriage Act, be included in the African Marriages 
Act. That provision requires the Minister’s consent, discussed 
supra, where a female intending to marry is under the age of 
16 years or a male intending to marry is under the age of 18 
years.
(5) As to the marriage of a minor without the consent of a 
guardian, it is recommended that such marriages under the 
African Marriage Act be made voidable at the instance of the 
non-consenting guardian instead of void, as presently 
provided. This would mean that, if the minor had since the 
date of the marriage become a major and wished to abide by 
the marriage, the marriage would remain valid. Provisions 
similar to those contained in section 21 and 22 of the 
Marriage Act could be introduced into the African Marriages 
Act.
(6) If an “ enabling certificate” were issued for the marriage of a 
minor under the Marriage Act even though the guardian of 
the minor had not consented, it would appear that the 
marriage of the minor is valid. According to the African 
Marriages Act, the marriage of a minor solemnized under the 
Marriage Act is void only if performed in the absence of an 
“ enabling certificate” . If section 12 were repealed, the 
marriage of an African minor under the Marriage Act 
without the consent of the guardian would be voidable by a 
non-consenting guardian.
(7) Sub-section (3) of section 3 should be clarified. It provides, 
inter-alia that an unregistered customary law union is invalid 
except for the purposes of African law and custom relating 
to the status, guardianship, custody and rights of succession 
of the children of such marriage. Many practical problems 
arise from this restriction on the recognition of unregistered 
customary law unions which comprises a large percentage of *•
Z. L. Rev. Voi. 1 & 2 1983-84
*• Section 23 of the Marriage Act.
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the marriages in Zimbabwe. Among the debatable issues is 
whether or not unpaid lobolo can be recovered if the 
marriage is not a registered one. See discussion supra. During 
the last couple of years, some courts have allowed such 
recovery while others have disallowed recovery on the ground 
that the marriage is invalid. The Ministry of Justice, Legal 
and Parliamentary Affairs had advised primary court 
presiding officers that husbands whose marriages are not 
registered may not recover damages for adultery because of 
the provisions of section 3 of the African Marriages Act. 
However, an excellent argument can be put forward that such 
recovery is still permissible and that section 3 (3) is not 
relevant to such an action for recovery of damages for 
adultery.
C. The Guardianship o f Minors Act, Chapter 34, should be 
amended to make clear which of its provision, if any, apply to 
marriages under the African Marriages Act. The two lecturers at 
the University who have taught Family Law during the past 
twelve years both feel that the Act applies only to marriages 
under the Marriage Act. However, certain high ranking officials 
in the Ministry o f Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 
consider that at least section 4 of the Guardianship of Minors 
Act also applies to marriages under the African Marriages Act.
The extent of the application of the Guardianship o f Minors Act 
therefore requires clarification. See discussion supra.
D. The Maintenance Act, Chapter 35 should be amended as follows:
(1) The definition of “ appropriate maintenance court”  in section 2 
should be reworded. At present that section provides:
“ appropriate maintenance court’ means-
(a) where the claim for maintenance is determinable 
according to customary law, a community court;
(b) in all other cases, a magistrate’s court;”  (emphasis 
added)
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However, community courts usually determine maintenance claims in 
accordance with section 12 (3) and (4) of the Primary Courts Act. 
Section 12 (4) provides:
“ (4) For the purposes of an order for maintenance in terms 
of sub-section (3) a community court shall, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
customary law. regard-
fa) the person who, according to customary law is the 
husband of a woman as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of the woman during the 
marriage and, after the dissolution of their 
marriage, until her remarriage:
(b) the father of a child as being primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of that child until the child 
attains the age of majority” .
Section 12 (4) is a statutory provision and thus part of the general law 
of Zimbabwe. Accordingly, when a community court makes a maintenance 
award in terms of section 12 (4), it is not making an award in accordance 
with customary law. It is therefore suggested that the definition of 
“appropriate maintenance court” in section 2 of the Maintenance Act be 
reworded to read as follows:
“ appropriate maintenance court’ means-
fa) where the claim for maintenance is determinable
according to customary law or under the provisions of 
the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, No. 6 of 
1981, a community court;
(b) in all other cases, .a magistrate’s court.” 60
(2) Section 6 (6) (c) provides that a maintenance court, in
making a maintenance order “ may include such award as to 
the maintenance court seems reasonable for the payment of 
maintenance which is in arrears” . However, without referring 
to section 6 (6) (c), the Supreme Court decided in the 
Musakwa case6' that the maintenance court was not 
competent to make an award of arrear maintenance as there 
was no existing maintenance order. It is respectfully 
submitted that, for several reasons, the Musakwa case was 
wrongly decided in this regard. The Supreme Court has 
stated in effect that the law is that if one parent maintains 
the children and the other parent fails to do so, the former 
parent may not recover any arrear maintenance from the 
neglectful parent. Such a ruling favours the irresponsible 
parent who fails to support his children. As a matter of 
public policy, this intolerable situation should be remedied. 
See further discussion in Musakwa note printed in this issue 
of the Zimbabwe Law Review.
E. The Married Persons Property Act, Chapter 38, should be 
amended as follows:
(1) This Act should apply to all marriages under the Marriage 
Act, including the marriages of two Africans under that Act. 
All parties marrying under the Marriage Act should, 
regardless of their race, have available to them the same 
; options as to the proorietary consequences of their marriage. 
(This should be combined with the repeal of section 13 of the 
African Marriages Act, discussed supra, anu the repeal of the 
Antenuptial Contracts Act, Cap. 29.) The Married Persons
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The wonting would have to be further appropriately altered if more courts were given the 
light to make maintenance orders under section 12 (4) of the Primary Courts Act.
Note 25, supra.
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Property Act should also be made applicable to the 
proprietary consequences of marriages under the African 
Marriages Act if the parties opt prior to their marriage to 
have the proprietary consequences of their marriage governed 
by general law.
(2) A marriage in community of property under Roman-Dutch 
Law means that the husband has the marital power over his 
wife, with the result that he manages all his and her financial 
affairs and that the wife cannot enter into a contract or sue 
or b ; sued unless assisted by him. In other words, the wife 
effectively reverts to the status of a minor for many 
purposes. There is no reason why Zimbabwe must follow the 
former law of South Africa in this respect.62 We could 
provide through a statutory provision that the marital power 
should be excluded or that the parties be allowed to exclude 
it. Many jurisdictions allow for community of property 
without the marital power. This means that during the 
marriage both spouses manage their own affairs and may 
freely contract and sue in their own name but that, at the 
time the marriage is terminated by the death of one of the 
spouses or by a divorce, each spouse, or his or her estate, 
receives one-half of the property in the community. Most 
women are much better off financially if they are married in 
community of property. It could well be that, if it were 
possible to exclude the marital power, many couples marrying 
under the law of this country would opt to marry in 
community of property. Many Africans might select this 
form of proprietary regime for their marriage if this option 
were available to Africans.
F. The Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39 (“ the Matrimonial 
Causes Act’’) should be amended as follows:
It should be made clear whether or not some or all of its 
provisions apply to marriages under the African Marriages Act. 
Former High Court Judge Pittman, when he was President of the 
court of appeals for African civil cases, wrote some judgments in 
which he maintained that some of the provisions of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act applied to marriages under the African 
Marriages Act.63 If it is intended that certain of the provisions of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act should apply to marriages under the 
African Marriages Act, the wording of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act should be altered so as to reflect that intention clearly.
62' South Africa got rid of the marital power this year with respect to marriages in community of 
property by enacting a  statute. The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984.
63 Mazorodze v. Jeneth, 1970 A A C  38.
G. The Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act, No. 39 of 1978 
(“ the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act” ) should be 
amended as follows:
Section 2 of the Act includes in the definition of a dependent 
“ the surviving wife or husband” . This would not seem to 
cover multiple wives married under the African Marriages 
Act or wives in the case of unregistered customary law 
unions. It would seem desirable to amend the definition of 
spouse to make it refer to “ surviving wife or wives, whether 
or not the marriage is registered” . By the recent insertion of 
section 12 (4) (a) into the Primary Courts Act, Parliament 
has made clear that it wished to make a husband who is a 
party to a customary law union responsible for supporting his 
wife until her death or remarriage. By the suggested 
amendment, the right of such wives to maintenance in the 
event of their husband’s death would be further secured.
H. Proposals fo r  Long Term Remedies
There are at least 23 different statutes relevant to family law 
and the law of succession in Zimbabwe at the present time. 
These are scattered throughout the present statute books and 
contain interlocking provisions. Provisions on the same topic . 
are often contained in more than one statute. For example, '  
at least seven different Zimbabwean statutes contain 
provisions about maintenance64 and there are also rules 
concerning maintenance in the various systems of customary 
law which are applicable in Zimbabwe. Earlier this year when 
the Supreme Court decided MusakwcP it apparently 
overlooked section 6 (6) (c) of the Maintenance Act which 
controls the issues of arrear maintenance. The oversight was 
understandable in view of the absence of legal practitioners 
to argue the case and there was no other means of bringing 
the relevant provision to the attention of the Court. This 
discussion is designed to demonstrate the need for a Code 
covering both family law and the law of succession.
included in such a Code should be a single Marriage A c t* ''* ^  
applying to all marriages in Zimbabwe. If there were a single 
Marriage Act, it would be possible to make all statutes 
relating to marriage, divorce and succession apply to all 
marriages. The complexity of existing provisions is a result of 
colonial laws passed by men who felt that African marriages 
were inferior and who were not concerned with the fate of 
African women.
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Matrimonial Causes Act, the Children’s Protection and Adoption Act (Chapter 33), the 
Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act (Chapter 36) and the Deceased Persons 
Family Maintenance Act.
;*** Note 25, supra.
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A major stumbling block to the development of a smgle 
Marriage Act, is of course, the issue of polygam ^That is an 
issue which will have to be resolved by the politicians. Most 
countries no longer allow polygamous marriages. Tanzania 
allows such marriages for any husband regardless of race. We 
cannot recommend such a solution for Zimbabwe. However, 
until a single Marriage Act is enacted, the problems of 
conflicts between customary law and general law in 
Zimbabwe in the fields of family law and the law of 
succession, are bound to increase.
CONCLUSION
Five years have passed since Independence. The most vital changes 
that have been made since majority rule in the area of family law are that 
African women attain majority status like all other Zimbabweans when 
they reach the age of 18 years of age and that racial criteria have been 
removed from internal conflict of law guidelines for determining whether 
customary law or general law applies to a dispute.
Nonetheless, there are many aspects of family law which still require 
revision so that equal rights will be available to all Zimbabweans and so 
that various outmoded laws can be abolished or amended to make family 
law relevant to the economic, social and political development of 
Zimbabwe. This is especially necessary as to inheritance and property rights 
of women and the proprietary consequences of the various forms of 
marriage in Zimbabwe.
Law reform alone will not solve the problem. As long as there are 
different forms of marriage and different consequences, it is unjust to 
expect persons intending to marry to choose between the various types 
of marriage without knowing what rights they are opting for and what 
rights they are foregoing. As has been demonstrated in this article because 
of the colonial heritage with respect to the statutory law, at the present 
time it is not possible for even legal practitioners to advise with certainty 
as to some of the consequences of various choices. This intolerable 
situation adds urgency to the need for law reform with respect to family 
law.
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Piecemeal changes in the law are necessary although they will never 
by themselves result in a real solution to the problem of unequal treatment 
by the law. Nevertheless they can at least be used to put an end to some 
gross injustices. While using such changes as interim measures, there is 
an urgent need to begin working on more basic and far reaching solutions 
to problems in the area of family law.
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